Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Terry J. Stephenson and Jill M. Payne : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company v. Terry J. Stephenson and Jill M. Payne :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James F. Housley; Attorney for Appellant Jill M. Payne.
Floyd A. Jensen; Attorney for Respondent the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Mountain States v. Stephenson and Payne, No. 860268.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1158
!»*»3S* 
OTA 
,Ak 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOfiStJNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
v. 
TERRY J. STEPHENSON, 
Defendant, and 
JILL M. PAYNE, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 860268 
Category No. 14b 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, District 
Judge, presiding. 
James F. Housley, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Jill M. Payne 
2001 S. State Street #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
The Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph 
Company 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
:f ST" 
N0V1G1987 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE : 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent : 
v. : 
TERRY J. STEPHENSON, 
Defendant, and 
JILL M. PAYNE, : 
Defendant and Appellant : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, District 
Judge, presiding. 
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
The Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph 
Company 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James F. Housley, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Jill M. Payne 
2001 S. State Street #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Case No. 860268 
Category No. 14b 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and 
Disposition 3 
Statement of Facts 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. PAYNE HAS THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
GRANTING MOUNTAIN BELL'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS 6 
II. A. PAYNE IS LIABLE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 7-15-1 AS A MATTER OF LAW 7 
B. SECTION 7-15-1 IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH 
SECTION 70A-3-403, AND EVEN IF IT WERE, 
IT WOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE AS A LATER 
ENACTMENT 11 
III. AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, SECTION 
7-15-1 DOES NOT INFRINGE PAYNE'S SUBSTANTIVE 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 14 
CONCLUSION 19 
i 
ADDENDA 
A. Complaint 
B. Answer and Affidavits 
C. Laws of Utah 1969, Chapter 240 
D. Laws of Utah 1977, Chapter 15 
E. Laws of Utah 1979, Chapter 92 
F. Laws of Utah 1981, Chapter 16, Section 13 
G. Laws of Utah 1986, Chapter 29 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1 2 
Utah Constitution, Amendment I, Section 7 2 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3 1 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 (1981) 1,2,3, 
5,7 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-2 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-403 (1965) 3,6,11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1953) * .| 1 
Laws of Utah 1969, Chapter 239 18 
Laws of Utah 1969, Chapter 240 10,18 
Laws of Utah 1977, Chapter 15 9 
Laws of Utah 1979, Chapter 92 10 
Laws of Utah 1986, Chapter 29 7 
Court Rule 
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 1 
Case Law 
Baker v. Matheson. 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979) 16 
iii 
Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983) 17 
Bountiful Citv v. DeLuca. 77 Utah 107, 292 P.2d 194 (1930) 15 
City of Alamogordo v. Walker Motor Co.. Inc.. 
616 P.2d 403 (N.M. 1980) 13 
Day-Brite Lighting. Inc. v. Missouri. 342 U.S. 421 
(1952) 15 
Ferguson v. Skrupa. 372 U.S. 726 (1963) 17 
First Security Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Wright. 521 
P.2d 563 (Utah 1974) 6 
Gord v. Salt Lake Citv. 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 
(1967) 8 
Howell's. Inc. v. Nelson. 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977) . 10 
Lindbeck v. Bendziunas. 84 N.M. 21, 498 P.2d 1364 (1972). 7 
Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 15 
Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) 15 
Polvglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449 (Utah 1979) .. 6 
Salt Lake Union Stockyards v. State Tax Commission. 
93 Utah 166, 71 P.2d 538 (1937) 8 
State v. Shondel. 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) 14 
Sterling Press v. Pettit. 580 P.2d 599 (Utah 1978) 13 
Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson. 15 Utah 2d 355, 
393 P.2d 391 (1964) 14 
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.. 428 U.S. 1 (1975).... 18 
Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981) ... 13 
West Jordan v. Morrison. 656 P.2d 445 (Utah 1982) 8 
Williamson v. Lee Optical Company, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) .. 17 
Wickard v. Filburn. 317 U.S. Ill (1942) 17 
Other Authorities 
Annot.
 # 97 A.L.R. 3d 798 § 5(a) (1980) 13 
v 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred by Article 
VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, and by 
Section 78-2-2(3)(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
This is a civil action for the collection of money on 
dishonored checks under Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is Appellant personally liable for the amount of a 
dishonored check under Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1, where 
Appellant signed the check on a corporate bank account for 
payment of services rendered by Respondent to the 
corporation, where Appellant was not an officer or principal 
of the corporation, but only an employee acting under the 
direction of an officer, and where Appellant had no interest 
in the funds, profits or assets of the corporation and 
believed there were or would be funds available to pay the 
check upon presentment? 
2. Does Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1, as applied to the 
facts of this case, violate Appellant's substantive due 
process rights under the United States or Utah Constitutions? 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are 
citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of laws. 
Utah Constitution, Amendment I, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1(1) (1981) 
Any person who makes, draws, signs or issues any 
check, draft, order, or other instrument upon any 
depository institution, whether as corporate agent 
or otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining from any 
person, firm, partnership, or corporation any 
money, merchandise, property, or other thing of 
value or paying for any service, wages, salary or 
rent, which check, draft, order, or other 
instrument is not honored upon presentment and is 
marked "refer to maker" or the account with the 
depository upon which the check, draft, order, or 
other instrument has been made or drawn, does not 
exist, has been closed, or does not have sufficient 
funds or sufficient credit with such depository 
for payment of the check, draft, or other 
instrument in full, shall be liable to the holder 
thereof. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-403(2) 
An authorized representative who signs his own name 
to an instrument 
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument 
neither names the person represented nor shows 
that the representative signed in a 
representative capacity; 
(b) except as otherwise established between 
the immediate parties, is personally obligated 
if the instrument names the person represented 
but does not show that the representative 
signed in a representative capacity, or if the 
instrument does not name the person 
represented but does show that the 
representative signed in a representative 
capacity. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Respondent and plaintiff The Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company (hereinafter "Mountain Bell") brought 
this action under Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 to collect several 
dishonored checks signed by defendants Terry J. Stephenson 
and Jill M. Payne, which were issued on a corporate bank 
account to pay for telephone service rendered to Namco 
Corporation. Default judgment was entered against defendant 
Stephenson, who has not appealed. Appellant Jill M. Payne 
(hereinafter "Payne") filed a pro se answer which did not 
deny the allegations of the complaint, but rather alleged 
that she was acting merely as a secretary in issuing the 
checks. Mountain Bell moved for judgment on the pleadings, 
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which the court granted after a hearing at which Payne 
appeared, filed an affidavit, and argued. After entry of 
judgment against Payne, James F. Housley, Esq. entered an 
appearance for her and filed alternative motions for relief 
from the order, amendment of the judgment, new trial, 
judgment n.o.v., and for findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. The court denied all motions, and this appeal followed. 
Statement of Facts 
Mountain Bell accepts Payne's statement of the facts, 
but would add that Payne never denied the essential 
allegations of Mountain Bell's complaint against her.1 Thus 
it is uncontroverted that she signed and issued the checks in 
question, that the checks were drawn on First Security Bank 
of Utah for payment of telephone services provided by 
Mountain Bell to Namco Corporation, that the checks were 
dishonored upon presentment, and that Mountain Bell complied 
with the notice requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-2.2 
1-The complaint and Payne's pro se answer and affidavits 
are set forth in Addenda A and B. 
2This provision requires written notice in a prescribed 
form, and states that it "shall be conclusively presumed to 
have been given when properly deposited in the United States 
mails, postage prepaid, by certified or registered mail, 
return receipt requested, and addresed to such signer at his 
address as it appears on the check, draft, order or other 
instrument or at his last known address." Although Payne 
filed an affidavit after judgment was entered in which she 
denied receipt of any notice (R. 41, paragraph 10), she never 
denied that the notice was sent as Mountain Bell alleged. 
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(R. 3-6) . Even after Payne's attorney entered his 
appearance, no effort was made to deny these facts. 
Payne's defense rests solely on the facts that she was 
not a corporate officer or principal, but only an employee 
acting under the direction of an officer, that she believed 
there were or would be funds available to cover the checks, 
and that she had no personal interest in the corporation or 
its funds. (R. 8, 24-25, 39-42). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. As Appellant, Payne has the burden of persuading 
this Court that the trial court committed reversible error. 
Since there are no disputed issues of material fact, the only 
issue to be decided is whether, as a matter of law, Payne is 
liable under Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1, where she signed the 
dishonored corporate checks merely as an employee acting 
under the direction of a corporate officer. 
2. Payne is personally liable under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7-15-1, which imposes liability on a person who signs a 
check "whether as corporate agent or otherwise." The statute 
was amended in 1979 to remove a requirement that the signer 
act "wilfully, with intent to defraud." Thus, Payne's state 
of mind and her lack of personal interest in the corporation 
are not defenses to a claim under the statute. 
3. Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Ann.r is not inconsistent 
with the Commercial Code provision dealing with the liability 
of an authorized agent who signs an instrument, Utah Code 
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Ann- § 70A-3-403. Section 70A-3-403 sets forth several 
conditions under which an agent may be personally obligated 
on an instrument. Section 7-15-1 does not abrogate any of 
those conditions, but simply provides for personal liability 
under additional conditions. In any event, Section 7-15-1 
takes precedence as a later enactment. 
4. Section 7-15-1, as applied to Payne, does not 
violate her substantive due process rights, because it is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest of 
promoting commerce by reducing the incidence of worthless 
checks, and by giving creditors an additional, expeditious 
means of recovering payment for goods and services furnished. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PAYNE HAS THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED REVERSIBUE ERROR IN GRANTING MOUNTAIN BELI/S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. 
It is axiomatic that an appellant has the burden of 
showing error by the trial court. This is true whether there 
was a plenary trial on the merits, or whether the case was 
decided as a matter of law, as in a directed verdict, summary 
judgment, or judgment on the pleadings. See Polyglycoat 
Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449, 450-51 (Utah 1979) (appeal 
from directed verdict); First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 
Wright, 521 P.2d 563, 567 (Utah 1974) (appeal from summary 
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judgment) . The presumption here must be that the trial 
court's ruling is correct unless Payne can show that she 
raised a genuine issue of material fact or that Mountain Bell 
is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Lindbeck 
v. Bendziunas, 84 N.M. 21, 498 P.2d 1364, 1370 (1972). 
The brief record makes abundantly clear that Payne did 
not dispute nor even raise any issue of fact, much less an 
issue of material fact. Thus, the sole legal question before 
this Court is whether Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 applies to a 
person who is not a corporate officer or principal, who signs 
a check on the corporate account merely as an employee of the 
corporation, at the direction of an officer, who has no 
interest in the assets of the corporation, and who has no 
knowledge that the check will not be honored upon 
presentment. 
POINT II 
A. PAYNE IS LIABLE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-15-1 AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
Section 7-15-1(1), Utah Code Ann. (1981),3 states as 
follows (the portion pertinent to this case being 
underlined): 
JThe statute has since been amended, Laws of Utah 1986, 
Ch. 29, although the amendment does not alter its substance. 
A complete history of the statute from its initial enactment 
in 1969, including amendments in 1977, 1979, 1981, and 1986, 
appears in Addenda C, D, E, F and G, respectively. 
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(1) Any person who makes, draws, signs or issues 
any check, draft, order, or other instrument upon any 
depository institution, whether as corporate agent or 
otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership or corporation any money, merchandise, 
property or other thing of value or paying for any 
service, wages, salary or rent, which check, draft, 
order, or other instrument is not honored upon 
presentment and is marked "refer to maker" or the 
account with the depository upon which the check, draft, 
order, or other instrument has been made or drawn, does 
not exist, has been closed or does not have sufficient 
funds or sufficient credit with such depository for 
payment of the check, draft, or other instrument in 
full, shall be liable to the holder thereof. 
This statute is clear and unambiguous; hence, it is not 
subject to interpretation. As stated in Salt Lake Union 
Stockyards v. State Tax Commission. 93 Utah 166, 71 P.2d 538, 
540 (1937): 
"When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous 
and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no 
occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory 
interpretation and construction; the statute must be 
given its plain and obvious meaning." 
Id. at 540 (quoting 25 R.C.L. 962). Accord, West Jordan v. 
Morrison. 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982); Gord v. Salt Lake 
City. 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (1967). In West 
Jordan v. Morrison, this Court stated: 
We must assume that each term in the statute was used 
advisedly by the Legislature and that each should be 
interpreted and applied according to its usually 
accepted meaning. Where the ordinary meaning of the 
terms results in an application that is neither 
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant 
contradiction to the express purpose of the statute, it 
is not the d .ty of this Court to assess the wisdom of 
the statutory scheme. 
656 P.2d at 446. 
As shown by the statutory language in Section 7-15-1, it 
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does not matter whether the person issuing the check signs in 
a representative or a personal capacity; liability is imposed 
on one who signs a dishonored check "whether as corporate 
agent or otherwise."4 Payne argues that this phrase should 
be interpreted to mean that only a corporation could be held 
liable on a dishonored corporate check. Such an 
interpretation is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the 
words used by the Legislature. To achieve the result desired 
by Payne, the Legislature would have to have used the words 
"by" or "through," not "as#" and could not have used the 
words "or otherwise" (e.g. "... whether by a corporate agent 
or principal...."). Thus, the fact that Payne was merely a 
corporate employee is no defense. The statute is simply 
incapable of a contrary interpretation. 
Similarly, the state of mind of the person signing the 
check is irrelevant. The statute imposes liability on an 
entirely objective standard. Thus, it does not matter 
whether Payne knew or believed there were sufficient funds in 
the account or whether she intended to defraud the payee, 
Mountain Bell. 
The legislative history of the statute supports this 
conclusion. As originally enacted, the statute required 
proof of an intent to defraud before liability attached. It 
4The quoted language was first inserted in the 1977 
amendment, which was apparently enacted for that express 
purpose. Laws of Utah 1977, Ch. 15 (a copy of which appears 
in Addendum D). 
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stated in pertinent part: "Any person who wilfully, with 
intent to defraud makes...any check..." Laws of Utah 1969, 
ch. 240, section 1(1) (emphasis added) (Addendum C) . The 
original statute created a rebuttable presumption of intent 
to defraud (by showing insufficient funds at the time the 
check was signed). See Laws of Utah 1969, ch. 240, section 2 
(Addendum C) . Nevertheless, because of the difficulties in 
proving intent to defraud and perhaps as a reaction to 
Howell's. Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977) (which 
held the statute inapplicable to checks written to pay on a 
past due account, because of the fraud element), the statute 
was amended in 1979 to omit the reference to intent to 
defraud. Laws of Utah 1979, ch. 92.5 
Based on that history, it is clear that the Legislature 
fully intended to establish a completely objective standard 
for fixing liability for dishonored checks. The policy 
behind such a rule is a salutary one of preventing passage of 
worthless checks, and of placing the risk of a check being 
worthless on the signer, who is in a better position to know, 
ascertain, or control whether it will be honored, rather than 
on the payee, who has no way of knowing for sure, short of 
processing the check for payment. It also greatly simplifies 
DA copy of the 1979 amendment appears in Addendum E. 
Payne incorrectly implies in her brief that the 1981 version 
was the first instance where the intent element was omitted. 
In fact, the 1981 version makes no substantive changes, but 
is primarily a recodification of the 1979 version with minor 
stylistic changes. See Addendum F. 
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and expedites the collection process, since most cases under 
the statute can be resolved without a trial. Furthermore, it 
avoids the quagmire of trying to determine whether in any 
given fact situation the signer is a "mere employee9m or a 
principal, or something in between. 
Payne cited Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 for the principle 
that Utah statutes are to be construed liberally "with a view 
to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote 
justice." Id. That principle supports, rather than weakens, 
Mountain Bell's argument. The only conceivable object the 
Legislature could have had in mind, by inserting the phrase 
"whether as corporate agent or otherwise" into the statute in 
1977, and by eliminating the intent element in 1979, was to 
create strict liability for a person who signs a check to pay 
for goods, services, rent or wages. 
B. SECTION 7-15-1 IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH SECTION 
70A-3-403, AND EVEN IF IT WERE, IT WOULD TAKE 
PRECEDENCE AS A LATER ENACTMENT. 
Section 3-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code, dealing 
with an agent's liability on instruments, was enacted in Utah 
in 1965, and has never been altered. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-
403 (1965). Section 7-15-1, on the other hand, was first 
enacted in 1969, and has undergone four amendments since 
then. As between the two statutes, the Legislature's more 
recent attention has been focused exclusively on Section 7-
15-1. 
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Payne notes correctly that statutes should be construed 
to be consistent if possible* Under that principle, Section 
7-15-1 is merely an extension of, and does not contradict, 
Section 70A-3-403. Section 70A-3-403(2) specifies several 
conditions under which an authorized agent who signs an 
instrument is personally obligated.6 Section 7-15-1 does not 
abrogate any of those provisions; rather, it imposes 
liability not only under those conditions, but under 
additional circumstances as well. A person who is liable on 
a dishonored check under Section 70A-3-403 will most likely 
also be liable under Section 7-15-1. 
Payne would read Section 70A-3-403 as limiting the 
circumstances under which an agent may be liable on an 
instrument; in essence, she argues that the word "if" means 
"only if." However, neither the statutory language nor logic 
justifies such a construction. Section 70A-3-403 extends 
liability; it does not limit it. 
6
"An authorized representative who signs his own name to 
an instrument 
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument 
neither names the person represented nor shows that 
the representative signed in a representative 
capacity; 
(b) except as otherwise established between the 
immediate parties, is personally obligated if the 
instrument names the person represented but does 
not show that the representative signed in a 
representative capacity, or if the instrument does 
not name the person represented but does show that 
the representative signed in a representative 
capacity." 
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Payne also argues that subsection (3) of Section 70A-3-
403 establishes that an agent is not liable if both the 
person represented and the representative capacity of the 
signer appear on the instrument. Appellant's Brief at 16. 
The section says no such thing; it simply provides that "... 
the name of an organization preceded or followed by the name 
and office of an authorized individual is a signature made in 
a representative capacity." Id. In any event, the 
subsection does not apply to the facts of this case because 
Payne has never alleged that the checks in question fit its 
pattern. 
Payne's arguments that Section 7-15-1 is harsh, penal 
and unjust when applied to a mere corporate employee could be 
applied equally to Section 70A-3-403, under which a simple 
failure of a signing agent to indicate her representative 
capacity may result in personal liability. See, e.g., cases 
collected in Annot., 97 A.L.R. 3d 798 § 5(a) (1980). See 
also, Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 
1981); Sterling Press v. Pettit. 580 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 
1978). It is inconsistent for Payne to embrace Section 70A-
3-403 as reasonable while attacking Section 7-15-1 as harsh 
and unjust. 
Even if there were a conflict between the statutes, the 
well-settled rule of construction granting precedence to a 
later-enacted statute would apply here. See, e.g., City of 
Alamogordo v. Walker Motor Co.. Inc.. 616 P.2d 403, 405 (N.M. 
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1980); State v. Shondel. 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146, 147 
(1969); Thiokol Chemical Corp, v. Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 
393 P.2d 391, 395 (1964) . Thus, to the extent of any 
irreconcilable inconsistency between Section 7-15-1 and 
Section 70A-3-403, Section 7-15-1 must be held to have 
impliedly repealed Section 70A-3-403. 
POINT III 
AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, SECTION 7-15-1 
DOES NOT INFRINGE PAYNE'S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
The essence of Payne's substantive due process argument 
is that Section 7-15-1 is arbitrary and capricious as applied 
to her because it makes her liable for the debt of another 
"without fault on her part" (Appellant's Brief at 19), and 
because the statute bears no rational relation to any 
legitimate governmental interest. Mountain Bell contends that 
the statute is rationally designed to promote and protect 
commerce, and therefore bears a rational relationship to a 
legitimate governmental interest; hence it is not arbitrary 
or capricious under substantive due process analysis. 
Payne argues that the statute, which was reenacted in 
1981 as part of the Financial Institutions Act, bears no 
relation to the supervision and regulation of financial 
institutions (Appellant's Brijf at 20-21). She assumes 
incorrectly that the "strict liability" elements of the 
statute (insertion of the phrase "whether as corporate agent 
or otherwise" and elimination of the intent to defraud 
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requirement) first came into being as part of the 1981 Act. 
The legislative history, however, establishes conclusively 
that those actions took place in 1977 and 1979 by specific 
legislation. (See Addenda D, E and F) . The 1981 
recodification of Section 7-15-1 simply perpetuates existing 
law. Thus there is no basis for arguing that the legislative 
purpose in enacting Section 7-15-1 was to facilitate 
supervision and regulation of financial institutions. 
The critical question on the issue of the 
constitutionality of Section 7-15-1 is whether it bears a 
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.7 
The most obvious purpose of Section 7-15-1 is to give 
merchants and providers of service a means of receiving 
payment for the goods and services they furnish. Reducing 
7
 In her argument on economic substantive due process, 
Payne cited cases which either have been overturned or which 
address a constitutional issue other than economic 
substantive due process. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 
(1934), Appellant's Brief at 20, adhered to the "substantial 
means-ends" relationship established in Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Lochner line of cases was 
substantively overruled in Dav-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. 
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952). 
Payne also cites Bountiful City v. DeLuca, 77 Utah 107, 
292 P.2d 194 (1930), Appellant's Brief at 19, 21, yet this 
case involved the "takings clause" (prohibiting the taking of 
private property for public use without just compensation) 
rather than the due process clause. 
By citing inappropriate cases, Payne has suggested a 
standard of review which is more stringent than the current 
"mere rationality" test presently used in economic 
substantive due process challenges. Since 1937, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has stricken no state statute on grounds that 
it violated economic substantive due process. By adhering to 
the level of review advocated by Payne, this Court would 
return to the type of judicial activism seen prior to 193 0. 
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uncollectible debt avoids the necessity of raising prices to 
cover that debt. The lower prices and continuation of 
merchants' businesses are beneficial to the state economy. 
If Payne's position were the law, it would be an easy matter 
for a corporation to arrange for a "mere employee" to sign 
worthless checks, then cause the corporation to default and 
dissipate its assets, leaving the creditor with no remedy. 
The State has a real and legitimate interest in avoiding that 
result and in protecting the State's economy. See Baker v. 
Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 242-43 (Utah 1979). Section 7-15-1 
is a rational means of accomplishing that goal. The question 
is not whether the method chosen to achieve a state interest 
is the wisest or least harmful. The constitutional standard 
is met if the chosen means bear any rational relationship to 
a legitimate state interest. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. 
Missouri. 342 U.S. 421 (1952). 
Significantly, Payne concedes that protection of 
commerce is a legitimate state interest and that there is a 
rational relationship between Section 7-15-1 and that 
interest. Appellant's Brief at 21. However, Payne argues 
that "[t]here is no indication that the legislation sought to 
promote that interest by the enactment of Section 7-15-1 in 
its present form." Appellant's Brief at 21-22. That 
argument fails to recognize that it is not incumbent upon the 
Legislature, when enacting a law, to spell out in detail the 
interests it wishes to promote and how the statute is 
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rationally related to those interests. It is sufficient if 
the court can discern any rational basis for the statute. 
See Williamson v. Lee Optical Company, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 
(1955). 
In Lee Optical. the Supreme Court summarized the 
development of the doctrine of substantive due process by 
stating: "The day is gone when this Court uses the Due 
Process Clause . . . to strike down state laws, regulatory of 
business and industrial conditions, because they may be 
unwise, improvident or out of harmony with a particular 
school of thought." Id. at 488. In essence, it is not the 
duty of a court to sit as a super legislature to weigh the 
wisdom of legislation. Ferguson v. Skrupa. 372 U.S. 726, 
729-32 (1963); Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 
1983). Thus, if Payne believes that Section 7-15-1 is 
unwise, harsh, or unjust, her remedy lies with the 
Legislature, not with the courts. The due process clause 
does not invalidate a statute merely because it is thought to 
be inequitable, harsh or unjust in a particular case. See 
Wickard v. Filburn. 317 U.S. Ill, 129-30 (1942). 
Payne argues that the State's interest in promoting 
commerce by discouraging the issuance of worthless checks is 
already served by the bad check provisions of the Criminal 
Code, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505. Appellant's Brief at 22. 
It would be nearly impossible to enumerate all the instances 
in which both civil and criminal liability can be imposed for 
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the same conduct. It is sufficient to note that when Section 
7-15-1 was originally enacted as Chapter 240 of Laws of Utah 
1969, it appeared immediately following Chapter 239, which 
established criminal liability for issuing bad checks. There 
can be no doubt that the Legislature intended to create 
concurrent civil and criminal liability for issuing bad 
checks. 
In summary, it is the challenger's burden to show a due 
process violation. Userv v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 
U.S. 1, 15 (1975). Payne has failed to sustain her burden of 
showing that Section 7-15-1 is not rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest. Thus, her constitutional 
challenge must be rejected. 
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CONCLUSION 
The legislative history and unambiguous language of 
Section 7-15-1 establish that judgment was properly entered 
against Payne, because she signed the checks "as corporate 
agent or otherwise," Neither her lack of interest in the 
corporation's assets, nor her status as a "mere employee," 
nor her belief that the checks would be paid, nor her lack of 
intent to defraud, constitute defenses. The statute passes 
constitutional muster because it is rationally related to the 
legitimate state interest of promoting commerce. Therefore, 
the judgment should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15 day of November, 1987. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
Flo^G A. Jensen, Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /3 day of November, 1987, 
I caused to be mailed four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Respondent's Brief, by first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, to the Appellant's attorney, James F. Housley, Esq,, 
at 2001 Se State Street #S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-
1200. 
4*_ 
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ADDENDUM A 
COMPLAINT 
FILMED j 
FLOYD A. JENSEN, Attorney 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
250 Bell Plaza, Suite 1610 
P. 0. Box 30960 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125 
Telephone: (801) 237-6409 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
TERRY J. STEPHENSON and JILL M. 
PAYNE, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
:iviifto.C82- 7638 
Plaintiff complains of defendants and for cause of action 
alleges as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff is a corporation duly authorized to do 
business in the state of Utah. 
2. Defendants Terry J. Stephenson and Jill M. Payne 
are residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
COUNT I 
3. On or about June 28, 1982, defendant Terry J. 
Stephenson drew, signed and issued a check payable to plaintiff 
in the amount of $3,981.62, drawn on the Heritage Bank & Trust 
for payment of past telephone services provided by plaintiff 
to NAMCO Corporation. 
4. Upon receipt of said check, plaintiff placed it for 
collection through normal banking channels. Thereafter 
plaintiff was notified by the aforementioned bank that the 
check was being dishonored and returned to plaintiff. 
5. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 7-15-2, Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1981), plaintiff notified defendant of the 
,.JC-WCJ£ 
nonpayment of the check by way of certified mail, return 
receipt requested. Defendant failed to respond to said notice 
within the seven (7) days provided by statute. 
6. Defendant, by drawing, signing and issuing said 
check and by failing to respond to plaintiff's notice within 
the time permitted by law, is in violation of Title VII, 
Chapter 15, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and plaintiff 
is entitled to recover the amount of said check as provided 
for therein, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs of 
court. 
COUNT II 
7o On or about March 17, 1982, defendant Terry Jc 
Stephenson drew, signed and issued a check payable to 
plaintiff in the amount of $2,384.17, drawn on First Security 
State Bank for payment of past telephone services provided by 
plaintiff to NAMCO Corporation. 
8. Upon receipt of said check, plaintiff placed it for 
collection through normal banking channels. Thereafter 
plaintiff was notified by the aforementioned bank that the 
check was being dishonored and returned to plaintiff. 
9. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 7-15-2, Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1981), plaintiff notified defendant of the 
nonpayment of the check by way of certified mail, return 
receipt requested. Defendant failed to respond to said notice 
within the seven (7) days provided by statute. 
10. Defendant, by drawing, signing and issuing said 
check and by failing to respond to plaintiff's notice within 
the time permitted by law, is in violation of Title VII, 
Chapter 15, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and plaintiff 
is entitled to recover the amount of said check as provided 
for therein, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs of 
court. 
COUNT III 
11. On or about March 23, 1982, defendant Terry J. 
"
2
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Stephenson drew, signed and issued a check payable to plaintiff 
in the amount of $1,117.00, drawn on the First Security State 
Bank for payment of past telephone services by plaintiff to 
NAMCO Corporation. 
12. Upon receipt of said check, plaintiff placed it for 
collection through normal banking channels. Thereafter 
plaintiff was notified by the aforementioned bank that the 
check was being dishonored and returned to plaintiff. 
13. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 7-15-2, Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 181), plaintiff notified defendant of the 
nonpayment of the check by way of certified mail, return 
receipt requested. Defendant failed to respond to said notice 
within the seven (7) days provided by statute. 
14. Defendant, by drawing, signing and issuing said 
check and by failing to respond to plaintiff's notice within 
the time permitted by law, is in violation of Title VII, 
Chapter 15, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and plaintiff 
is entitled to recover the amount of said check as provided 
for therein, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs of 
court. 
COUNT IV 
15. On or about January 29, 1982, defendant Jill M. 
Payne drew, signed and issued a check payable to plaintiff 
in the amount of $582.30 drawn on the First Security Bank of 
Utah for payment of past telephone services provided by 
plaintiff to NAMCO Corporation. 
16. Upon receipt of said check, plaintiff placed it for 
collection through normal banking channels. Thereafter 
plaintiff was notified by the aforementioned bank that the 
check was being dishonored and returned to plaintiff. 
17. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 7-15-2, Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1981), plaintiff notified defendant of the 
nonpayment of the check by way of certified mail, return receip 
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requested. Defendant failed to respond to said notice within 
the seven (7) days provided by statute. 
18. Defendant, by drawing, signing and issuing said check 
and by failing to respond to plaintiff's notice within the time 
permitted by law, is in violation of Title VII, Chapter 15, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and plaintiff is entitled to 
recover the amount of said check as provided for therein, plus 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court. 
COUNT V 
19. On or about February 2, 1982, defendant Jill M. Payne 
drew, signed and issued a check payable to plaintiff in the 
amount of $900.00 drawn on the First Security Bank of Utah for 
payment of past telephone services provided by plaintiff to 
NAMCO Corporation. 
20. Upon receipt of said check, plaintiff placed it for 
collection through normal banking channels. Thereafter plaintiff 
was notified by the aforementioned bank that the check was being 
dishonored and returned to plaintiff. 
21. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 7-15-2, Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1981), plaintiff notified defendant of the 
nonpayment of the check by way of certified mail, return receipt 
requested. Defendant failed to respond to said notice within the 
seven (7) days provided by statute. 
22. Defendant, by drawing, signing and issuing said check 
and by failing to respond to plaintiff's notice within the time 
permitted by law, is in violation of Title VII, Chapter 15, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and plaintiff is entitled to 
recover the amount of said check as provided for therein, plus 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court. 
COUNT VI 
23. On or about February 3, 1982, defendant Jill M. Payne 
drew, signed and issued a check payable to plaintiff in the 
amount of $1,378.21 drawn on the First Security Bank of Utah for 
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payment of past telephone services provided by plaintiff to 
NAMCO Corporation. 
24. Upon receipt of said check, plaintiff placed it for 
collection through normal banking channels. Thereafter plaintiff 
was notified by the aforementioned bank that the check was being 
dishonored and returned to plaintiff. 
25. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 7-15-2, Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1981), plaintiff notified defendant of the 
nonpayment of the check by way of certified mail, return receipt 
requested. Defendant failed to respond to said notice within 
the seven (7) days provided by statute. 
26. Defendant, by drawing, signing and issuing said check 
and by failing to respond to plaintiff's notice within the time 
permitted by law, is in violation of Title VII, Chapter 15, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and plaintiff is entitled to recover 
the amount of said check as provided for therein, plus reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs of court. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against defendants 
Terry J. Stephenson and Jill M. Payne as follows: 
1. In the amount of $3,981.62, plus a reasonable attorney's 
fee, against defendant Terry J. Stephenson pursuant to Count I. 
2. In the amount of $2,384.17, plus a reasonable attorney's 
fee, against defendant Terry J. Stephenson pursuant to Count II. 
3. In the amount of $1,117.00, plus a reasonable attorney's 
fee, against defendant Terry J. Stephenson pursuant to Count III. 
4. In the amount of $582.30, plus a reasonable attorney's 
fee, against defendant Jill M. Payne pursuant to Count IV. 
5. In the amount of $900.00, plus a reasonable attorney's 
fee, against defendant Jill M. Payne pursuant to Count V. 
6. In the amount of $1,378,21, plus a reasonable attorr-y's 
fee, against defendant Jill M. Payne pursuant to Count VI. 
7. For interest and costs incurred in bringing this 
action. 
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8. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and appropriate. 
DATED this I day of September, 1982. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
Floyd A. Jensen, Attorney 
Plaintiff's Address: 
250 Bell Plaza, Suite 1610 
P. 0. Box 30960 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125 
Telephone: (801) 237-6409 
ADDENDUM B 
ANSWER AND AFFIDAVITS! 
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subordinate, who followed tne direction of corporate supervision 
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Floyd A. Jensen, Attorney FIUO !N CLARK'S OPHCf 
Mountain States Telephone & * * • w 
Telegraph Company -
 ?| 
250 Bell Plaza, Suite 1610 \\A l\ O 09 iH 00 
P.O. Box 30960 .. ... ,t 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125 ^ °[^) &-#*** 
Re: Complaint Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Cdnrpahyn^ B^ ylye^ f^ g 
Stephenson and Jill M. Payne 
Civil // C82-7638 /1 ^  <^n ^ 1\j?? 
Count I 
Denied I have no knowledge of this check 
Count II 
denied I have no knowledge of this check 
Count III 
Denied I have no knowledge of this check 
Count IV 
Denied I deny this count on the basis of: 
A. I was an employee of Namco Corporation 
B. I was a secretary functioning under the direction and supervision 
of Terry J. Stephenson 
Count V 
Denied I deny this count on the basis of: 
A. I was an employee of Namco Corporation 
B. I was a secretary functioning under the direction and supervision 
of Terry J. Stephenson 
Count VI 
Denied I deny this count on the basis of: 
A. I was an employee of Namco Corporation 
B. I was a secretary functioning under the direction and supervision 
of Terry J, Stephenson 
Wherefore defendant Jill M. Payne asks for dismissal of counts IV through 
VI against said defendant. 
Defendant Jill M. Payne functioned only as a secretary during her time of 
employment at Namco Corporation. She had no Corporate interest and was 
following corporate direction on the issuance of said checks. 
Dated this , day of February 1986. 
cc: 
County Clerk 
Salt Lake Third Judicial Court 
240 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
XJ ff 
AFFIDAVIT 
Re: Complaint - Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph 
Company vs Terry J. Stephenson and Jill M. Payne 
Civil // C82-7638 
During my time of employment at Namco Corporation, I 
functioned under the direction of Terry J. Stephenson 
as his personal secretary. One of my duties was accounts 
payable clerk where under the direction of Mr. Stephenson 
I issued checks to meet the financial obligations 
encumbered by the Corporation. I functioned only as a 
subordinate who followed direction of corporate supervision 
in performing tasks which are generally considered inherent 
to a secretary's role. At all times when checks were 
issued and mailed, there were either funds to cover the 
checks in the account or promise, by Terry J. Stephenson, 
of money wires to be received from California the 
following day. As a secretary for the Corporation, I 
should not be held accountable or liable for any financial 
obligations of Namco Corporation. 
I hereby certify and swear that the above statements 
are true. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this I/ day of 
February, 1986. 
tfotar/ Public 
Residing at: 
Salt Lake County 
CC: 
County Clerk 
Salt Lake Third Judicial Court 
240 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAMES F. HOUSLEY (Bar #1545) 
Pro Bono Attorney for Defendant, Pay 
Volunteer Lawyers Project 
Utah State Legal Services 
231 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8*111 
Telephone: 363-7900 
^jf^J^^y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
ANf> 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TERRY J. STEPHENSON and 
JILL M. PAYNE, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT, 
JILL M. PAYNE 
Civil No. C82-7638 
Scott Daniels, Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Jill M. Payne, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. That her true full name is Jill Maxine Nelson 
Payne and that she is the defendant named as Jill M. Payne 
in the pleadings in the above case; 
2. That her date of birth is February 10, 1953; 
3. That she has no formal training except: 
a. Hiqh school through the eleventh grade at 
West High School; 
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h. High school degree from South High night 
school in 1971; 
c. Graduated from Real Estate School at Trade 
Tech in 19*3; 
4, That she has no other training except through 
work experience as follows: 
a. Homemaker, and mother, 1970 - present? 
b. Trader's secretary for Dean Witter, 1976-77; 
c. Employee at Orkin Pest Control, 6 mos. in 1978; 
d. Secrtary Jordon Meat Company, 19.78-81; 
e. Secretary/bookkeeper, NAMCO Corporation, 1981-82; 
f. Real Estate salesperson Wardley Real Estate Company, 
1983-present; 
5, That she was divorced and has been working to 
support her two children since 1978; 
6. That her employment with NAMCO Corporation was 
as a secretary/bookkeeper and as such she typed correspondence 
and other papers for said corporation, assisted the officers 
in keeping the books and at their direction prepared and 
signed checks drawn upon the Corporation accounts in 
payment of the corporate obligations; 
7. That in her capacity as bookkeeper she was 
generally knowledgeable concerning the status of said 
corporation's checking accounts but that other employees, 
including the officers, issued checks against said accounts 
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without her knowledge. 
8. That she was careful not to issue checks 
except under circumstances where she had information that 
there were funds in said accounts to cover said checks, but 
that from time to time other employees and officers issued 
checks against said account without her knowledge which 
resulted in the failure of some of said checks to clear the 
bank ; 
9. That the services provided by plaintiff for 
which checks were written by the undersigned were provided 
to NAMCO Corporation and that the undersigned received no 
benefit therefrom, either directly or indirectly and that 
the undersigned has never had any ownership interest in 
said Corporation or its assets including the funds in the 
accounts upon which said checks were written; 
10. That to her knowledge she never received, 
directly or indirectly, any notices pursuant to SS7-15-2, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended; 
11. That upon receipt of Summons in the above 
case she attempted to obtain legal counsel to represent 
9 
her, but due to her stringent financial condition was 
unable to do so; 
12. That she has absolutely no legal training, 
at least in the area outside of that acquired by a graduate 
of a Real Estate Salesman's School and flops not have any 
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training or knowledge in the area of Civil Procedure or 
Statutes dealing with checks; 
13. That when she was unable to employ legal 
counsel to represent her, she attempted to represent herself 
as best she could be filing and serving the papers and 
appearing at all hearings which she did? 
14. That she has no understanding of the 
significance, substantive or procedural, of the papers she 
has received or the proceedings she attended; 
15. That she honestly believes that she has 
sufficient legal and equitable defenses to the claims 
asserted against her herein. 
Dated this ~7 day of May, 1986. 
Subscribed and 
of May, 1986. 
My Commission Expires: 
M. Payne 
rn to before me this / day 
M l r y l u b l k ^ Residing at WZF£*.*% 
ADDENDUM C 
LAWS OF UTAH 1-16 9, PHAPTER J U) 
CHAPTER 240 
H. B. No. 11 (Passed January 30, 1969. In effect May 13, 1969) 
CHECKS AGAINST NONEXISTENT ACCOUNTS 
An Act Relating to Checks, Drafts or Orders Issued Against Nonexistent 
Account or Insufficient Funds; Providing for Civil Liability to the 
Holder and for Damages in Actions Based on This Liability; and Pro-
viding for Presumptions Regarding Willfulness and Intent and for 
Notice. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Checks returned by bank—Civil liability—Interest, costs and 
attorney's fees. 
(1) Any person who willfully, with intent to defraud makes, draws 
or issues any check, draft or order upon any bank, banking association 
or other depositary for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, 
partnership or corporation any money, merchandise, property or other 
thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary or rent, which 
check, draft or order is not honored upon presentment because the maker, 
drawer or issuer does not have the accoimt with the depositary upon 
which the check, draft or order has been made or drawn, or does not have 
sufficient funds in such account or sufficient credit with such depositary 
for payment of the check, draft or order in full, shall be liable to the 
holder of the check, draft or order in a civil action as provided in this 
section. 
(2) In.such civil action the person making, drawing or issuing the 
check, draft or order shall be liable to the holder of it for the amount 
thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including all court costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees. 
Section 2. What constitutes intent to defraud. 
In any such civil action any of the following shall be prima facie evi-
dence that the person making, drawing or issuing the check, draft or order 
did so willfully with an intention to defraud: 
(1) Proof that at the time of issuance, the maker, drawer or issuer 
did not have the account with the depositary upon which the check, 
draft or order was made or drawn or did not have sufficient funds in his 
account or credit with the depositary for payment in full of the check, 
draft or order, and that he failed within ten days after receiving notice 
of nonpayment or dishonor to pay the check, draft or order; or 
(2) Proof that when presentment was made within a reasonable 
time, the maker, drawer or issuer did not have the account with the 
depositary upon which the check, draft or order was drawn or made or 
did not have sufficient funds in such account or credit with such de-
positary for payment in full of the check, draft or order, and that he 
failed within ten days after receiving notice of nonpayment or dishonor 
to pay the check, draft or order. 
Section 3. Definition of notice—Manner of giving. 
"Notice" as used in this act means notice given to the maker, drawer 
or issuer of the check, draft or order, either in person or in writing. Such 
notice in writing shall be conclusively presumed to have been given when 
properly deposited in the United States Mails, postage prepaid, by cer-
tified or registered mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to such 
maker, drawer or issuer at his address as it appears on the check, draft 
or order or at his last known address. 
Approved February 10, 1969. 
ADDENDUM D 
LAWS OF UTAH 1977, CHAPTER 15 
CHAPTER 15 
S. B. No. 41 (Passed March 8, 1977. In effect May 10, 1977) 
FRAUDULENT CHECK ISSUANCE 
AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 7-15-1, 7-15-2, 7-15-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, 
AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 240, LAWS OF UTAH 1969; RELATING TO ISSUANCE 
OF FRAUDULENT CHECKS; PROVIDING FOR LIABILITY OF BUSINESS 
ENTITY AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL FOR ISSUING A FRAUDULENT CHECK. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 240, 
Laws of Utah 1969, is amended to read: 
7-15-1. Drawing, issuing or signing against nonexistent account or 
insufficient funds—Civil liability—Damages. 
(1) Any person who willfully, with intent to defraud makes, draws
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signs or issues any check, draft or order upon any bank, banking 
association or other depositary , whether as corporate agent or otherwise, 
for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership or 
corporation any money, merchandise, property or other thing of value or 
paying for any services, wages, salary or rent, which check, draft or order is 
not honored upon presentment because the [maker, drawer or ioouor dooo 
not have the] account with the depositary upon which the check, draft or 
order has been made or drawn, does not exist, has been closed or does not 
have sufficient funds [in oueh aoeount] or sufficient credit with such 
depositary for payment of the check, draft or order in full, shall be liable to 
the holder of the check, draft or order in a civil action as provided in this 
section. 
(2) In such civil action the person making, drawing , signing or issuing 
the check, draft or order shall be liable to the holder of it for the amount 
thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including all court costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
Section 2. Section amended. 
Section 7-15-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 240, 
Laws pf Utah 1969, is amended to read: 
7-15-2* Civil action—Evidence of intent. 
In [any oueh] a civil action any of the following shall be prima facie 
evidence that the person making, drawing , signing or issuing the check, 
draft or order did so willfully with an intention to defraud: 
(1) Proof that at the time of issuance, the [maker, drawer or ioouor did 
not have the] account with the depositary upon which the check, draft or 
order was made or drawn, did not exist, has been closed or did not have 
sufficient funds [4«—hio account] or credit with the depositary for payment 
in full of the check, draft or order, and that he failed within ten days after 
receiving notice of nonpayment or dishonor to pay the check, draft or order; 
or 
(2) Proof that when presentment was made within a reasonable time, 
the [maker, drawer or ioouor did not have the] account with the depositary 
upon which the check, draft or order was drawn or made, did not exist, has 
been closed or did not have sufficient funds [in ouch aeoount] or credit with 
such depositary for payment in full of the check, draft or order, and that he 
failed within ten days after receiving notice of nonpayment or dishonor to 
pay the check, draft or order. 
Section 3. Section amended. 
Section 7-15-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 240, 
Laws of Utah 1969, is amended to read: 
7-15-3. Notice of nonpayment or dishonor—When presumed. 
"Notice" [ao uocd in thio act] means notice given to the [maker, drawer or 
ioouer of ] person making, drawing or issuing the check, draft or order, 
either in person or in writing. Such notice in writing shall be conclusively 
presumed to have been given when properly deposited in the United States 
mails, postage prepaid, by certified or registered mail, return receipt 
requested, and addressed to such [maker, drawer or ioouer] signer at his 
address as it appears on the check, draft or order or at his last-known 
address. 
Approved March 19, 1977. 
ADDENDUM E 
LAWS 01' UTAH 1979, CHAPTER 92 
FRAUDULENT CHECKS 
CHAPTER 92 
S. B. No. 103 (Passed March 1, 1979. In effect May 8, 1979) 
RETURNED CHECKS 
AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 7-15-1 AND 7-15-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 240, LAWS OF UTAH 1969, AS AMENDED BY 
CHAPTER 15, LAWS OP UTAH 1977, AND REPEALING SECTION 7-15-2, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 240, LAWS OF UTAH 
1969, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 15, LAWS OF UTAH 1977; RELATING TO 
RETURNED CHECKS; REMOVING THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO INTENT 
TO DEFRAUD; ALLOWING IMPOSITION OF SERVICE CHARGES FOR DIS-
HONORED CHECKS; REQUIRING WRITTEN NOTICE BEFORE FILING CIVIL 
ACTION; PROVIDING FOR MINIMUM ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS 
IN CIVIL ACTIONS; AND PROVIDING A WRITTEN NOTIFICATION FORMAT. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 240, 
Laws of Utah 1969, as amended by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah 1977, is 
amended to read: 
7-15-1. Drawing or issuing against closed or nonexistent account or 
insufficient funds—Notice of intent to file civil action—Civil liabil-
ity—Damages. 
(1) Any person who [willfully, with intent to defraud] makes, draws, 
signs or issues any check, draft or order upon any bank, banking association 
or other depositary, whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for the pur-
pose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership or corporation any 
money, merchandise, property or other thing of value or paying for any ser-
vices, wages, salary or rent, which check, draft or order is not honored upon 
presentment [bocausol and is marked "refer to maker" or the account with 
the depositary upon whieh the check, draft or order has been made or 
drawn, does not exist, has been closed or does not have sufficient funds or 
sufficient credit with such depositary for payment of the check, draft or 
order in full, shall be liable to the holder of the check, draft or order [ia-a 
civil action as provided in this soctionl. 
(2) The holder of a check, draft, or order which has been dishonored may 
give written or verbal notice thereof to the person making, drawing, sig-
ning, or issuing the check, draft, or order and may impose a service charge 
not to exceed $5 in addition to any contractual agreement between the par-
ties. Prior to filing an action based upon this section, the holder of a dishon-
ored check, draft, or order shall give the person making, drawing, signing, 
or issuing the dishonored check, draft, or order written notice of intent to 
file civil action, allowing the person seven days from the date on which the 
notice was mailed to tender payment in full, plus a service charge if 
imposed, for the dishonored check, draft or order. 
[(3)1 (3) In [s«eb] a civil action the person making, drawing, signing or 
issuing the check, draft or order shall be liable to the holder of it for the 
amount thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including all court 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
Section 2. Section amended. 
Section 7-15-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 240, 
Laws of Utah 1969, as amended by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah 1977, is 
amended to read: 
7-15-3. Notice of nonpayment or dishonor—When presumed—Form and 
contents. 
tt] "Notice" means notice given to the person making, drawing or issuing 
the check, draft or order, either in person or in writing. Such notice in writ-
ing shall be conclusively presumed to have been given when properly depos-
ited in the United States mails, postage prepaid, by certified or registered 
mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to such signer at his address 
as it appears on the check, draft or order or at his last-known address. 
(2) Written notice as applied in subsection 7-15-1(2) shall take the follow-
ing form: 
Date 
To 
You are hereby notified that check(s) described below issued by you has 
been returned to us unpaid. 
Check dated 
Check number 
Originating bank 
Amount 
Reason for dishonor (marked on check) 
The foregoing check together with a service charge of $5 must be paid to 
the undersigned within seven days from the date of this notice in accordance 
with Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, or appropriate civil legal 
action may be filed against you for the amount due and owing together with 
service charges, interest, court costs, and attorney fees as provided by law. 
In addition, the criminal code provides in Section 76-6-505, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953: Any person who issues or passes a check for the payment 
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, 
or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for 
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by 
the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad 
check. The foregoing civil action does not preclude the right to prosecute 
under the criminal code of the State of Utah. 
(Signed) 
Name of Holder 
Address of Holder 
Telephone Number 
Section 3. Repealer. 
Section 7-15-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 240, 
Laws of Utah 1969, as amended by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah 1977, is 
repealed. 
Approved March 14, 1979. 
ADDENDUM F 
LAWS Dl li'l'Ul I'JiJl, CHAPTER 16, SECTION 13 
Section 13. Chapter enacted. 
Chapter 15 of Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
7-15-1. Civil liability of issuer—Notice. 
(1) Any person who makes, draws, signs or issues any check, draft, 
order, or other instrument upon any depository institution, whether as corpo-
rate agent or otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, 
partnership or corporation any money, merchandise, property or other thing 
of value or paying for any service, wages, salary or rent, which check, draft, 
order, or other instrument is not honored upon presentment and is marked 
"refer to maker" or the account with the depository upon which the check, 
draft, order, or other instrument has been made or drawn, does not exist, has 
been closed or does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit with such 
depository for payment of the check, draft, or other instrument in full, shall 
be liable to the holder thereof. 
(2) The holder of the check, draft, order, or other instrument which has 
been dishonored may give written or verbal notice thereof to the person 
making, drawing, signing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other instru-
ment and may impose a service charge not to exceed $5 in addition to any 
contractual agreement between the parties. Prior to filing an action based 
upon this section, the holder of a dishonored check, draft, order, or other 
instrument shall give the person making, drawing, signing, or issuing the dis-
honored check, draft, order, or other instrument written notice of intent to 
file civil action, allowing the person seven days from the date on which the 
notice was mailed to tender payment in full, plus a service charge is imposed 
for the dishonored check, draft, order, or other instrument. 
(3) In a civil action the person making, drawing, signing or issuing the 
check, draft, order, or other instrument shall be liable to the holder of it for 
the amount thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including all court 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
7-15-2. Notice form. 
(1) "Notice" means notice given to the person making, drawing, or issu-
ing the check, draft, order, or other instrument either in person or in writing. 
Such notice, in writing, shall be conclusively presumed to have been given 
when properly deposited in the United States mails, postage prepaid, by certi-
fied or registered mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to such signer 
at his address as it appears on the check, draft, order, or other instrument or 
at his last-known address. 
(2) Written notice as applied in subsection 7-15-1 (2) shall take the fol-
lowing form: 
Date: 
To: 
You are hereby notified that check(s) described below issued by >ou has been 
returned to us unpaid-
Instrument date: 
Instrument number: 
Originating institution: 
Amount: 
Reason for dishonor (marked on instrument): 
The foregoing instrument together with a service charge of S5 must be 
paid to the undersigned within seven days from the date of thts notice in 
accordance with section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, or appropriate 
civil legal action may be filed against you for the amount due and owing 
together with service charges, interest, court costs, and attorney's fees as pro-
vided by law. 
In addition, the criminal code provides in section 76-6-505, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953: Any person who issues or passes a check for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad 
check. The foregoing civil action docs not preclude the right to prosecute 
under the criminal code of the State of Utah. 
(Signed) 
Name of Holder: 
Address of Holder: 
Telephone Number: 
ADDENDUM G 
LAWS OF UTAH 1986, CHAPTER 29 
CHAPTER 29 
S. B. No . 49 
Passed February 20, 1986 
Effective April 28, 1986 
BAD CHECK SERVICE CHARGE 
INCREASE 
By Richard J. Carling 
AN ACT RELATING TO FINANCIAL INSTIT-
UTIONS: INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF 
SERVICE CHARGE WHICH MAY BE 
IMPOSED BY THE HOLDER OF A FRAUD-
ULENT CHECK, DRAFT, ORDER, OR 
OTHER INSTRUMENT: AND MAKING 
CERTAIN EDITORIAL CHANGES. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS Or UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
7-15-1, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 16, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1981 
7-15-2, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 16, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1981 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 16, Laws of Utah 1981, is 
amended to read: 
7-15-1. Civil liability of issuer - Notice. 
(1) Any person who makes, draws, signs, or issues 
any check, draft, order, or other instrument upon 
any depository institution, whether as corporate 
agent or otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining 
from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation 
any money, merchandise, property, or other thing 
of value or paying for any service, wages, salary, or 
rent, [which] shall be liable to the holder of the 
check, draft, order, or other instrument if the 
check, draft, order, or other instrument is not 
honored upon presentment and is marked "refer to 
maker" or the account with the depository upon 
which the check, draft, order, or other instrument 
has been made or drawn [?] does not exist, has been 
closed, or does not have sufficient funds or suffic-
ient credit with [sueh] tjhe depository for payment of 
the check, draft, or other instrument in full[, shall 
be liable to the holder thereof]-
(2) The holder of the check, draft, order, or other 
instrument which has been dishonored may give 
written or verbal notice [thefeef] of dishonor to the 
person making, drawing, signing, or issuing the 
check, draft, order, or other instrument and may 
impose a service charge not to exceed [$$] $10 in 
addition to any contractual agreement between the 
parties. Prior to filing an action based upon this 
section, the holder of a dishonored check, draft, 
order, or other instrument shall give the person 
making, drawing, signing, or issuing the dishonored 
check, draft, order, or other instrument written 
notice of intent to file civil action, allowing the 
person seven days from the date on which the notice 
was mailed to tender payment in full, plus [a] the 
service charge [«] imposed for the dishonored 
check, draft, order, or other instrument. 
(3) In a civil action the person making, drawing, 
signing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other 
instrument shall be liable to the holder of it for the 
amount [fcbefee*] of the check, draft, order, or 
other instrument, for interest, and for all costs of 
collection, including all court costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
Section 2. Section Amended. 
Section 7-15-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 16, Laws of Utah 1981, is 
amended to read: 
7-15-2. Notice form. 
(1) "Notice" means notice given to the person 
making, drawing, or issuing the check, draft, order, 
or other instrument either in person or in writing. 
Such notice, in writing, shall be conclusively prcj. 
umed to have been given when properly deposited i* 
the United States mails, postage prepaid, by eery.! 
fied or registered mail, return receipt requested, and 
addressed to such signer at his address as it appear 
on the check, draft, order, or other instrument or * 
his last known address. 
(2) Written notice as applied in Subsection 7-15. 
1 (2) shall take the following form: 
Date: 
To: 
You are hereby notified that check(s) described 
below issued by you has been returned to us unpaid: 
Instrument date: 
Instrument number: 
Originating institution: 
Amount: 
Reason for dishonor 
(marked on instrument): 
The foregoing instrument together with a servict 
charge of [$$] SjO must be paid to the undersigned 
within seven days from the date of this notice ii 
accordance with Section 7-15-1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, or appropriate civil legal action 
may be filed against you for the amount due and 
owing together with service charges, interest, court 
costs, and attorney's fees as provided by law. , 
In addition, the criminal code provides in Section 
76-6-505, Utah Code Annotated 1953: Any 
person who issues or passes a check for the payment 
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any 
person, firm, partnership, or corporation, am 
money, property, or other thing of value or paying! 
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent,) 
knowing it will not be paid by the drawee awl 
payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of 
issuing a bad check. The foregoing civil action does 
not preclude the right to prosecute under the crim-
inal code of the state of Utah. 
(Signed) I 
Name of Holder: 
Address of Holder: 2 
Telephone Number: t 
Approved March 12, 1986 
